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November 23, 2010
Abstract
A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities
(such as airports or art galleries) is the scheduling and deployment of patrols. Motivated by
the problem of optimizing randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols, we present a class of
patrolling games. The facility to be patrolled can be thought of as a network or graph Q of
interconnected nodes (e.g. rooms, terminals) and the Attacker can choose to attack any node
of Q within a given time T: He requires m consecutive periods there, uninterrupted by the
Patroller, to commit his nefarious act (and win). The Patroller can follow any path on the
graph. Thus the patrolling game is a win-lose game, where the Value is the probability that
the Patroller successfully intercepts an attack, given best play on both sides. We determine
analytically either the Value of the game, or bounds on the Value, for various classes of
graphs, and discuss possible extensions and generalizations.
Subject classications: Games, noncooperative; Military, search/ surveillance; Deci-
sion Analysis, risk; Networks/ graphs
Area of review: Military and Homeland Security
Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
yOperational Research Group, Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London.
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1 Introduction
A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities is the
scheduling and deployment of patrols. This problem is encountered by, for example:
 security guards patrolling a museum or art gallery;
 antiterrorist o¢ cers patrolling an airport or shopping mall;
 police forces patrolling a city containing a number of potential targets for theft such as
jewelry stores;
 soldiers patrolling an occupied city or territory;
 air marshals patrolling an airline network;
 inspectors patrolling a container yard or cargo warehouse.
Such problems have been studied in diverse literatures. For example, a well-known problem
in computational geometry deals with the position of security guards in art galleries (Urrutia,
2000) and a classical Operations Research literature exists on the scheduling of police patrols
(see e.g. Larson (1972) and references therein). The importance of randomized patrols has
been recognized in law enforcement for some time, but not the nature of the randomization
(e.g. Sherman and Eck (2002, p. 297)). Much of the optimization literature on this subject
(e.g. Chelst, 1978) concentrates on the important problem of how to deploy randomized patrols
to maximize the probability of intercepting a crime in progress, when the crime frequency of
di¤erent locations is taken as given (often a realistic assumption, at least in the short term).
Such models however are not game theoretic and do not capture the idea of a patrolling schedule
as a strategy selected in the face of an intelligent and malign adversary, for example an art thief or
terrorist, which is a distinctive feature of the class of models we study in this paper. Although
there do exist di¤erential game formulations of the relationship between police and criminal
(Isaacs, 1999, Feichtinger, 1983) these tend to focus on a dynamic (and often strategic) process
of mutual adjustment rather than confronting the problem confronted by the scheduler who sits
down to determine the path which the patrol will take.
Game theoretic analyses have recently featured prominently in OR studies of homeland
security and counterterrorism (e.g. Brown et al., 2006, Bier and Azaiez, 2009, Lindelauf et
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al., 2009). An attractive and unique feature of game theoretic formulations in the context of
patrolling is that they provide insight into how a Patroller should randomize her patrols. There
is a clear common-sense rationale for randomization: a predictable Patroller is an ine¤ective one.
Yet a naive "maximum entropy" heuristic (Fox et al, 2005) may be not fare well: faced with
n targets it may not make sense to spend 1=n of the available patrolling time with each of
them. This dilemma has attracted considerable attention recently amongst practitioners and
the research community has responded to this challenge: in particular, the work of Paruchuri
and colleagues (2007) provides a number of heuristic models which illustrate how equilibrium
randomized strategies can be approximated when the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg
(leader-follower) game, and such models have found use in real security situations (Gordon,
2007; Newsweek, 2007).
Our work on this problem is inspired by the theory of search games, on which an extensive
mathematical literature has developed over the last few decades. This theory captures situations
in which a Searcher aims to minimize the time taken to nd a stationary or mobile Hider, who
does not want to be found, on a network or in a region (Alpern and Gal, 2003). A variant on the
the search game is the Accumulation game (Ruckle, 2001; Kikuta and Ruckle, 2001) where the
Hider distributes some sort of continuous material over n locations, and the Searcher searches r
locations and conscates any material hidden there; if the amount of material remaining exceeds
a certain critical level, the Hider wins, otherwise he loses. There are also related literatures on
Inspection games (Avenhaus, von Stengel and Zamir, 2002), in which an Inspector who seeks
to catch an Inspectee red-handed, and Inltration games (Auger, 1991; Garnaev, Garnaeva and
Goutal, 1996; Garnaev, 2000, and Alpern, 1992) in which a Guard seeks to prevent an Inltrator
from penetrating some sensitive facility. Similar attack/ defence games have been studied in
military operations research (Washburn, 2003), dating as far back as Morse and Kimball (1950).
Many such games are of independent mathematical interest and have been studied in a purely
mathematical settings (e.g. Baston, Bostock and Ferguson, 1989; Zoroa, Zoroa and Ruiz, 1988).
Various results are available for how the Searcher/ Inspector/ Guard/ Defender should proceed,
depending on the assumptions about the structure of the mathematical space which she inhabits.
A particularly productive line of research in the search game literature has been to explore the
case where the search space can be thought of as a network or graph, as we do here.
In this paper we formulate a game which we call the Patrolling Game. Unlike the work of
Paruchuri and colleagues, our problem is a zero-sum game, and provides for a defender who is
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mobile, being able to travel between locations in the course of her shift (a "Patroller"). Unlike
search games, our "Attacker" (the equivalent of the search game "Hider") may commence his
attack at any time and has to be detected within a given time-window in order to forestall
the performance of some misdeed. Like the Accumulation game, and unlike the standard search
game, our game is win-lose - a game of type rather than degree in the terminology of Isaacs (1999).
Our problem is su¢ ciently idealized that it is possible to obtain insightful analytic results, but
su¢ ciently realistic that it is recognizable as a practical problem faced by practitioners in various
domains.
We present some analytic results for this game, and demonstrate that it yields patrolling
(and attacking) strategies which are natural and intuitive. We are in this paper unable to
present general analytic results for all games of this type, and it seems unlikely that closed form
expressions exist for the value and optimal mixtures. Indeed, even computing optimal strategies
may be quite challenging in many cases, because of the combinatorial explosion in the Patrollers
strategy space.
This paper is organized as follows. We present in Section 2 a rigorous formulation of
patrolling games, together with some elementary observations on properties of the Value. As
the number of pure strategies for the players can be very large, we give in Section 3 three
methods for reducing the number that we have to consider: symmetrization, dominance and
decomposition. Section 4 discusses certain classes of strategies that the players can use on any
graph, and which are optimal on certain classes of graphs. Section 5 gives either the Value, or
bounds on the Value, for patrolling games on certain classes of graphs: Hamiltonian, bipartite
and line graphs. Section 6 presents extensions of the model and concludes.
2 The Patrolling Game
2.1 Formulation
The Patrolling Game G = G (Q;T;m) is a win-lose (and hence zero-sum) game between a
maximizing Patroller (female) and a minimizing Attacker (male). It comes in two forms, the
one-o¤ game Go = Go (Q;T;m) and the periodic game Gp = Gp (Q;T;m) : The one-o¤ game is
played out over a given time interval T = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; T   1g of length T on a graph Q with n
nodes N and edges E . We will assume that Q is connected unless stated otherwise, and we say
two nodes are "adjacent" if they are linked by an edge. A pure strategy for the Attacker is a
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pair [i; I] ; where i 2 N is called the attack node and I = f ;  + 1; : : : ;  +m  1g  T is an
m-interval called the attack interval. A pure strategy for the Patroller is a walk w : T !Q called
a patrol. If i 2 w (I) we say that the patrol intercepts the attack, in which case the Patroller
wins and the payo¤ is P = 1; otherwise the Attacker wins and we have P = 0: Thus the payo¤
is given by
P (w; [i; I]) =
8><>: 1 (Patroller wins); if i 2 w (I) (attack is intercepted);0 (Attacker wins); if i =2 w (I) (attack is completed uninterrupted);
The Value V o of this game Go is thus the probability that the attack is successfully intercepted.
Except in trivial cases, optimal strategies must be mixed.
The periodic game is played on the time circle T  = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; T   1g of length T on a
graph Q with n nodes N and edges E; the asterisk denotes that arithmetic using the indices of
time circle takes place modulo T . As in the one-o¤ game, a pure strategy for the Attacker is a
pair [i; I] ; where i 2 N is the attack node and I  T  is the attack interval but attack intervals
are now m-intervals in the time circle, so for example if T is 24 and m is 5; the attack could be
carried out overnight, during the interval f22; 23; 0; 1; 2g (10 oclock to 2 in the morning). The
patrols (Patroller pure strategies) are now walks of period T (w : T  ! N ) but must "join up"
in the sense that they satisfy (w (T   1) ; w(0)) 2 E (no such restriction applies in the one-o¤
game).
The periodic game is simpler to analyze because the attack can be assumed to take place
equiprobably in any time interval, which simplies the analysis (see Subsection 3.1). When
the values of the games di¤er, we will use the superscripts V p and V o to distinguish between
the Values, using V when the result applies to both cases. V (V p, V o) can be considered as
parameterized byQ, T , andm just as G is, but most of the time writing V (Q;T;m) is distracting
and confusing and we will tend to suppress some or all of these arguments. We denote by d(i; i0)
the distance function on the node set N , the minimum number of edges between i and i0 2 N :
This formulation makes a number of assumptions which are not in fact as restrictive as they
might appear. The rst is the assumption an attack will take place. An immediate response
to this is that even though attacks occur very rarely, one should patrol on the assumption that
an attack will happen - otherwise what is the point of patrolling at all? A more sophisticated
response is that the parties are really engaged in a non-zero sum deterrence game and the
Patroller only has to reduce the probability of attack to a level where the expected value of
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the attack is less than the value to the Attacker of engaging in an attack elsewhere (another
airport, another art museum). As it turns out, however, the game studied in this paper can be
seen as being embedded in a larger non-zero sum deterrence game in the manner of Avenhaus,
von Stengel and Zamir (2002). In this case the key to the analysis of the larger non-zero
sum game is precisely the analysis of the game discussed in the current paper. The second
and third assumptions are that the node values are equal (all paintings are worth the same
amount of money; the damage inicted by an attack at some airport terminal will be the same
as at any other airport terminal), and that the distances between nodes are equal, respectively.
Obviously this may well not hold in an application setting. It is not hard to modify the
modelling framework to include these features. However, beyond rather simple results of the
sort proved in this section, it is di¢ cult to obtain analytic results for games which incorporate
these complexities.
2.2 General Properties of the Value V
We now make some observations about the Value V , which apply to both one-o¤ and periodic
versions of the game. We start with a monotonicity result (Lemma 1), the last part of which
involves the notion of identifying nodes of a graph. If a graph Q0 can be created by successively
"merging" pairs (or tuples) of nodes in Q such that the new, merged node in Q0 inherits edges
from its constituent nodes in Q (i.e. if i and i0 in Q are merged to become j in Q0, the nodes
adjacent to j are precisely those adjacent to either i or i0) we say that Q0 can be obtained from
Q by node identication (Bondy and Murty, 2007). Formally this identication operation can
be dened by a projection map  : N ! N 0; where N 0 is the node set of the new graph Q0;
and  1 (j) represents a set of nodes of Q that have been identied. For example, we can easily
obtain the line graph with n nodes Ln by vertically identifying nodes of the cycle with 2 (n  1)
nodes C2(n 1) (see Figure 1 for the case n = 5).
Figure 1. L5 as a projection of C8:
Lemma 1
1. V (Q;T;m) is nondecreasing in m:
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2. V (Q;T;m) cannot decrease if an additional edge is added between two nonadjacent nodes
of the graphQ. That is, V is nondecreasing in E (with the ordering on the latter understood
in the sense of set inclusion).
3. V p (Q;T;m)  V o (Q;T;m)
4. If Q0 is obtained from Q by node identication, V (Q0)  V (Q) :
Proof. The rst part follows from the observation that a patrol that intercepts an attack [i; I]
also intercepts [i; I 0] if I 0  I: The next two are based on the fact that in a zero sum game
a player cannot do worse if he gets additional strategies. The last is based on the following
observation: If a patrol w intercepts an attack on a node i of Q then the patrol  (w) intercepts
the associated attack on the node  (i) of Q0: So the Patroller can ensure that the expected
payo¤ is at least V (Q) by choosing patrols w for Q according to some optimal mixed strategy,
and then playing the projected patrol  (w) :
The next result gives easy general bound on the Value.
Lemma 2 1n  V  mn , for V equal to V p or V o and any parameters Q, T and m. More
generally, V  !=n; where ! is the maximum number of nodes that any patrol can cover (!
depends on whether the one-o¤ or periodic version is being played).
Proof. The Patroller can obtain the left inequality by randomly picking a node and waiting
there. The Attacker can obtain the right inequality by attacking a random node during some
xed time interval I. Of these n pure strategies, the Patroller can intercept at most jw (I) j 
jIj = m of them, giving the bound m=n; or more generally the bound !=n; since jw (I) j  ! by
denition.
It is worth observing that ! is bounded above by the node size of the largest component of
Q (if it is not connected), with !=n equalling 1=n for the completely disconnected graph. Also
note that for the one-o¤ game with m = 1; where Q is the complete graph Kn; this is a special
case of Ruckles "Simple Search Game" (Ruckle, 1983). Since we thus have (from Part 2 of
Lemma 1) V = 1=n whenever m = 1; we will assume for the remainder of the paper that m  2.
In real life, the authority responsible for Patrolling may have a decision to make about shift
length involving weighing e¤ectiveness against some cost criterion (and cost may be convex and
increasing in shift length because of a requirement to pay overtime at a higher rate). What can
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we say about the impact of shift length on interception probability, i.e. the shape of V (T ), in
order to help the authority make this sort of decision?
Proposition 3 1. V o(T + 1)  V o(T )
2. V p(kT )  V p(T ) 8k = 1; :::;1
Proof. The rst result holds because the Attacker pure strategy set for Go(T + 1) contains his
pure strategy set in Go(T ): note that the Patroller strategy sets are the same, with an irrelevant
truncation of w(T + 1) in Go(T ): For the second result, note that the Patroller can ensure a
winning probability of V p(T ) in the game Gp(kT ) by picking a T -periodic walk according to an
optimal strategy in Gp(T ) and repeating it k times; but as there may be strategies available in
Gp(kT ) which have no analogues in Gp(T ) the value may be strictly higher.
Thus in the one-o¤ game, increasing the time T helps the Attacker, by giving him more
choices of when to attack. The situation in the periodic game is more complicated. Increasing
T by a multiplicative factor always helps the Patroller. However for some graphs V p(T +1) may
be less than V p(T ), so a larger T is not always better for the Patroller in the periodic game.
An example where increasing T may hurt the Patroller is discussed in Section 5 and depicted in
Figure 7.
An interesting implication of Proposition 3 and Lemma 1 part 3 is that the gap between the
one-o¤ and periodic game decreases as T is multiplied:
Corollary 4 0  V o(kT )  V p(kT )  V o(T )  V p(T ) 8k = 1; :::;1
Note that it is not the case that V p() is nondecreasing in T : for example, for the periodic
game on the n-cycle, Cn, V p(T = n + 1) is strictly less than V p(T = n) for m  2 because
the Patroller has to "waste" a time period by remaining at some node in order to return to
her starting point. In Section 5.1, we show that for the games on certain sorts of graphs (e.g.
Hamiltonian) the maximum value of the periodic game is obtained with a certain periodicity
which is a function of n. Note also that both inequalities can be strict - for example in Section
3.3 we analyze Go(L6; 5; 3) and show it has value 3/8; however, by choosing 123 and 456 with
equal probability, the Patroller can obtain 1/2 in Go(L6; 3; 3).
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3 Strategy Reduction Techniques
Even for small graphs, the number of pure strategies available to the players can be quite
large. So for practical purposes, as well as in proofs, it is useful to have methods for reducing
the number of strategies that must be considered. This section discusses three such methods:
symmetrization, dominance and decomposition.
3.1 Symmetrization
Symmetry considerations can simplify both the placement and timing of attacks and patrols.
First we consider the placement of attacks in terms of the spatial symmetry of Q: As an example,
note that the nodes 2 and 3 are symmetrically placed in the Kite Graph KT of Figure 2. So it
follows from well-known arguments (Alpern and Asic, 1985; Zoroa and Zoroa, 1993) that there
is an optimal mixed Attacker strategy with the property that, for any attack interval I, these
two nodes are attacked with equal probability.
4
3
2
51
Figure 2. Kite Graph KT
This idea can be formalized by considering the automorphisms of Q; that is, the adjacency-
preserving bijections of Q: (For the kite graph there are only the identity automorphism and the
reection about the vertical axis.) Calling nodes equivalent if some automorphism  of Q takes
one into the other, we need consider only attacks equiprobably distributed over the equivalence
class of nodes. Similarly, two patrols w1 and w2 are equivalent if w2 (t) = w1 (t) for some
automorphism , and we can restrict our attention to the equiprobable mixture of such patrols.
A similar line of reasoning applies to time. In the periodic game all attack intervals are
equivalent under some rotation of the time circle, so we need only consider the attack node. In
the one-o¤ game, attack intervals I1 and I2 are equivalent if  (I1) = I2 where  is the reection
automorphism of the time interval T = f0; : : : ; T   1g dened by  (t) = T   t:
The fact that we need only consider symmetrical strategies, that is, mixed strategies which
give equal probability to equivalent strategies, is demonstrated in Alpern and Asic (1985), and
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Zoroa and Zoroa (1993). Given a game G we call the modication of G where we restrict
attention to Attacker and Patroller strategies which are equiprobable mixtures over the equiv-
alence classes dened by the space and time automorphisms, the symmetrization of G; this
symmetrized game has the same value as the original G, but has fewer strategies and so is easier
to study.
3.2 Dominance
Since the Patrolling Game is a win-lose game, we can use the following weak notion of dominance.
We say a pure strategy s1 dominates a pure strategy s2 of the same player if it wins against every
opponent strategy that s2 wins against, and against at least one more. The Value is unchanged
if we successively eliminate dominated strategies.
As an example of how successive elimination of dominated strategies can be used, consider
again the kite graph KT of Figure 2. Node 4 is what we call a penultimate node, that is, a
non-leaf node that is adjacent to a leaf node (node 5 in KT ): Our next result shows that there
is an optimal strategy on KT which does not involve any attacks on a penultimate node.
Lemma 5 Assume Q is connected and T  3: For m  2, patrols that stay on any node
for three consecutive periods are dominated. For m  3; attacks on penultimate nodes are
dominated, and consequently the Attacker has an optimal strategy concentrated on nodes which
are not penultimate.
Proof. The proof is by iterated dominance. Suppose the patrol w1 is at the same node i for
the three consecutive periods I = ft  1; t; t+ 1g. Dene w2 to be the same as w1 except that
w2 (t) = i
0; where i0 is adjacent to i: For m  2; the patrol w2 intercepts every attack that w1
intercepts, as well as the attack on i0 during I; and hence dominates w1: So we can now assume
that at equilibrium the Patroller does not use patrols which stay at a node for three consecutive
periods. Next suppose that i0 is a penultimate node adjacent to a leaf node i: We now show
that any attack on node i0 during an m interval I is dominated by an attack on i during I: If
w wins against the attack [i; I] ; then w (t) = i; for some t 2 I: If m  3, then I contains at least
three consecutive periods, therefore, therefore one of the sets ft   2; t   1; tg, ft   1; t; t + 1g,
ft; t + 1; t + 2g is contained in I. Let t0 and t00 be the two of these periods di¤erent from t
and contained in I. By the earlier argument, we know that either w(t0) or w(t00) is i0 and so
i0 2 w (I) ; and w wins against [i0; I] : Hence attacking at node i0 is a dominated strategy.
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3.3 Decomposition
Sometimes we can think of a graph Q as being made up of simpler graphs Q1 and Q2: We call
this a decomposition of Q. The nodes of the original graph Q are the union of the nodes Q1
and Q2: All nodes which are adjacent in Q are also adjacent in any Qi which contains both
of them. See Figure 3 for an illustration. Q can of course be decomposed into multiple Qi
through repeated decomposition. If the nodes of Q1 and Q2 are disjoint and Q has no edges
between nodes in distinct Qi; then we say it is a disjoint decomposition.
Q Q1
Q2
Figure 3. Decomposition of a graph
Lemma 6 Let V = V (Q;T;m) and Vk = V (Qk; T;m) : If the graphs Qk; k = 1; : : : ;K; form
a decomposition of Q; then
V  1PK
k=1 1=Vk
;
with equality in the case of a disjoint decomposition.
Proof. Suppose the Patroller restricts herself to a family of mixed strategies Sk; where Sk is an
optimal mixed strategy for the game G (Qk; T;m) : Suppose she picks Sk with a probability qk
such that qkVk = c is constant. In this case we have
1 =
KX
k=1
qk = c
KX
k=1
1=Vk; or c = 1=
KX
k=1
1=Vk:
For any attack pair [i; I] ; the node i belongs to the node set of some graph Qk. So with
probability qk the Patroller will be optimally patrolling Qk and in this case will intercept the
Attacker with probability at least Vk: Hence the Patroller wins with probability at least qkVk = c:
Hence the value of the game on graph Q is at least c; as claimed. If the Patroller is only allowed
to patrol nodes from a single graph Qk; the best she can do is win with probability c, so it
follows that if the graphs Qk have disjoint node sets and are disconnected, then V = c:
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3.4 Examples
In this subsection, we deal with two examples which illustrate the use of the tools discussed
previously in this section, and also demonstrate the some of the subtleties of this class of game.
Our rst example shows that, in the one-o¤ game, it may be the case that the Attackers optimal
strategy may involve a time-varying strategy; our second example shows how our tools can be
used to tackle an apparently quite complex game.
For our rst example, to illustrate the ideas of symmetry and dominance, we now analyze
the line graph L6 with nodes i = 1; : : : ; 6; for the case T = 5 and m = 3: The product of
L6 (drawn vertically) and the time space T = f1; : : : ; 5g (drawn horizontally) is shown three
times in Figure 3. An attack with probability p at node i and time interval ft  1; t; t+ 1g is
represented by a p at the middle of the attack interval (i; t). Since there are three possible attack
intervals (f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4g ; f3; 4; 5g) there are 6 3 = 18 possible attacks.
We rst consider the one-o¤ game Go (L6; 5; 3) in a restricted form where the Attacker must
use a time-invariant strategy. This is illustrated in the left drawing of Figure 4, where there are
no attacks at penultimate nodes (f2; 5g) (using Lemma 5). Since nodes 1 and 6; and nodes 3
and 4 are equivalent under symmetry, we can assume they are attacked with equal probability.
Hence this symmetric and time-invariant strategy is entirely characterized by two numbers, x
and y, and (by the law of total probability) 6x+6y = 1: The patrol w1 = (3; 2; 1; 2; 3) intercepts
all attacks at node 1 and two attacks at node 3, so wins with probability 3x + 2y; similarly
w2 = (1; 2; 3; 4; any) intercepts one attack at node 1 and ve attacks at nodes 3 and 4, and
wins with probability x + 5y: These two patrols together dominate all others. So the Attacker
minimaxes when 3x + 2y = x + 5y: This occurs when x = 1=10 and y = 1=15; with minimax
value V  = 13=30. (An easy calculation then shows that the Patroller should adopt w1 and w2
with probabilities 4=5 and 1=5:)
i\t
1
2
3
4
5
6
1        2          3         4         5
xxx
y
x x x
y
y
yy
y
1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8 1/81/8
1/8 1/8
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Figure 4. Optimal attacking and patrolling strategies for Go(L6) with T = 5 and m = 3
In the (unrestricted) game Go (L6; 5; 3) it is harder to derive the equilibrium strategy pair,
but it is fairly easy to demonstrate that the Value is V o = 3=8 = 0:375 ; which shows that no
time-invariant mixed Attacker strategy can be optimal. To see that V o  3=8, consider the
Attacker strategy shown in the middle drawing, and observe that no patrol can intercept more
than three of the eight equiprobable attacks. For a lower bound, suppose the Patroller adopts
the four strategies (2; 1; 2; 3; 4) ; (2; 3; 4; 5; 6) and their reections (5; 6; 5; 4; 3) ; (5; 4; 3; 2; 1) with
probability 1=8 each; and adopts the two equivalent strategies (3; 2; 1; 2; 3) and (4; 5; 6; 5; 4) with
probability 1=4 each. The walks adopted with probability 1=8 are shown in the right panel of
Figure 4 by thin diagonal lines and those in adopted with probability 1=4 by thick lines. Attacks
are shown by heavy dots at the center of the attack interval. The assertion V o  3=8 follows
from the observation that any possible attack is intercepted by at least three of the patrols,
counting the thick lines as two (i.e. the total probability mass associated with all the walks
passing through, immediately to the right of, and immediately to the left of every dot is at least
3=8). It is also interesting to observe that all ten attacks which are not used at all in the middle
drawing are intercepted by more than three of these patrols. Thus, the Value of the one-o¤
game Go (L6; 5; 3) is 3=8; but securing this value requires the use of time-dependent Attacker
strategies: the middle node is only to be attacked in the middle time interval f3; 4; 5g :
Next we analyze the periodic version, the game Gp (L6; 5; 3) : This is similar to the restricted
version of the one-o¤ game discussed above, except that the middle of the attack can be at any
time, so comparing with the left drawing of Figure 4, the xs and ys would extend throughout
the rows, and so we have 10x + 10y = 1. We need only consider four patrols (together with
their symmetric translations): w1 = (1; 2; 1; 2; 1); w2 = (1; 2; 3; 2; 1); w3 = (1; 2; 3; 3; 2) and
w4 = (3; 4; 3; 4; 3): the others are either dominated (because they spend time needlessly at
a penultimate node which will never be attacked at equilibrium) or are duplicates. If the
Attacker attacks at an end node (with probability 10x), these four strategies will intercept 5, 4,
3, and 0 attacks respectively; if the Attacker attacks at a central node (with probability 10y)
they intercept 0, 3, 4 and 10 attacks respectively. As this game e¤ectively has two Attacker
strategies it can be easily solved graphically: the optimal strategy involves the Attacker choosing
attacks with probability x = 7110 , y =
4
110 and the Patroller mixing between w2 and w4 and their
symmetric translations with probability 1011 and
1
11 respectively. The value V
p of the game is
4=11:
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Observe that the conditional probability of an attack being intercepted given that the Pa-
troller plays the equilibrium mixture of w2 and w4is 4/11, 5/11, 4/11,4/11, 5/11, 4/11 for attacks
at a random time at nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 respectively. Thus the penultimate nodes (2 and 5)
should not be attacked, as the interception probabilities are higher by 1/11. This reinforces and
(hopefully) makes intuitive the iterated dominance line of reasoning: loosely speaking, when the
Patroller ensures that attacks at 4 and 6 are intercepted with probability 4/11, the intermediate
node 5 automatically gets covered enough to have an even higher interception probability.
To summarize, for line graph L6, with T = 5 and m = 3; we have
V p =
4
11
< V o =
3
8
< V  =
13
30
Thus the Patroller does better in the one-o¤ game, and thus the bound stated in Lemma 1 Part
3 need not be tight. Further, in this instance, the Attacker has to adopt a time-dependent
strategy in order to benet fully.
For our second example, to demonstrate the use of all of our strategy reduction techniques,
we analyze the periodic game for the kite graph illustrated in Figure 2 with T = m = 3. The
dominance argument of Lemma 3 showed that, at equilibrium, the Attacker would never attack
node 4, as it is always better for him to attack the adjacent leaf node 5. Moreover, in the
periodic case for T = 3, there is no feasible Patroller strategy which visits both node 5 and any
one of 1, 2, or 3. Therefore, if we remove node 4, the game on the resulting graph KT 0 has the
same Value as the game on KT:
Q1
Q2
3
2
5
1
Figure 5. Decomposition of Kite graph KT into KT 0
Lemma 6 shows that for Q1 and Q2 as in Figure 5, we have
V p
 
KT 0

=
1
1=V p (Q1) + 1=V p (Q2)
(1)
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Obviously V p (Q2) = 1, and it can be easily shown that V p (L3) = 1=2 for T = m = 3 (observe
that as attacks adjacent to the a leaf node are dominated, the Attacker has two strategies, to
attack at nodes 2 and 3, which are reections of each other and so are played equiprobably; no
feasible Patroller strategy can intercept both). Hence by (1) we have
V p (KT ) = V p
 
KT 0

=
1
1 + 2
=
1
3
:
This is another example where the Patroller does strictly better in the one-o¤ game, in which
V o = 3=5: To see this, rst note that by Lemma 2 the Attacker can ensure that V o  m=n = 3=5
by attacking equiprobably at the ve nodes. Then observe that by using the four patrols (2; 1; 3) ;
(2; 4; 5) ; (3; 4; 5) ; (1; 4; 5) with respective probabilities 2=5; 1=5; 1=5; 1=5 the Patroller ensures any
attack at any node will be intercepted with probability 3=5 and thus that V o  3=5: Note that
if edge (1; 4) is removed, the Value V o goes down to 1/2; the Attacker chooses nodes 1 and 5
equiprobably and the Patroller chooses the rst three of the above patrols with probabilities
1=2; 1=4; 1=4:
4 Generic Strategies
In general, the type of strategies available to the Patroller depends crucially on the path and
circuit structure of the underlying graph Q: However, for purposes of analysis, it is possible to
identify certain generic strategy types which are available on all graphs; or on all graphs in a
class. We study three generic strategies for the Attacker: the uniform strategy, the diametrical
strategy, and the independent strategy.
4.1 The uniform strategy
Our rst strategy is an Attacker strategy called the uniform strategy, in which the attack [i; I]
has i and I chosen equiprobably and independently over their domains. That is, a random node
is attacked at a random time. In the periodic game this strategy is the equiprobable mixture
of the nT possible attacks. For the purposes of the next result, we make use of a standard
denition:
Denition 7 A graph is bipartite if it has no odd cycles.
The reader will note that (for example) all trees are bipartite.
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We have already shown that V  mn . For bipartite graphs we are able to tighten this bound.
Lemma 8 If T is odd and Q is bipartite, the bound of Lemma 2 can be tightened to V p 
(T 1)m+1
nT . This bound is guaranteed by the Attacker adopting the uniform strategy in the
periodic game.
Proof. In the uniform strategy, all nT possible attacks are adopted with probability 1=(nT ): If
T is odd, and there are no odd cycles (because Q is bipartite), then for any w, w (t) = w (t+ 1)
for some t in the periodic game: In these two periods (that is, t and t + 1), at most m + 1 of
the attacks can be intercepted, and as before at most m in each of the other T   2 periods. So
at most (T   2)m + (m+ 1) = (T   1)m + 1 attacks can be intercepted altogether, giving the
desired inequality.
4.2 The diametrical strategy
The diameter d of a graph Q is given by d = maxi;i02N d (i; i0) : A pair of nodes at distance d is
called diametrical, and the Attackers diametrical strategy is to attack these nodes equiprobably
during a random time interval I: It is easy to show the following. If d is very large with respect
to m and T then it is clear the best the Patroller can do against the diametrical strategy is
to wait at one of the nodes and win half the time. On the other hand if m and T are large,
the best the Patroller can do in the one-o¤ game is go back and forth repeatedly on a geodesic
between the diametrical points and win with probability m=
 
2 d

: Since she cannot do better
in the periodic game, we have the following.
Lemma 9 V  max m=  2 d ; 1=2 : The diametrical strategy guarantees this payo¤.
4.3 The independent strategy
The graph theoretic notion of independence and covering numbers has already been shown to
be useful in accumulation games (Alpern and Fokkink, 2008). We give here modied versions
of these concepts.
Denition 10 A patrol w is called intercepting if it intercepts every attack on a node that it
contains. That is, if a node i lies on a patrol w; then it appears in any subpath of w of length
m: A set of intercepting patrols is called a covering set if every node of Q is contained in at
least one of the patrols. The covering number J is the minimum cardinality of any covering
set.
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Denition 11 If, for any two nodes i and j, any patrol which intercepts an attack at node
i in attack interval I, cannot also intercept an attack at j in attack interval I, then i and j
will be said to be independent. In the one-o¤ game Go; this is equivalent to requiring any
two nodes to satisfy d (i; i0)  m; in the periodic game Gp, they must satisfy d (i; i0)  m or
T  2 d (i; i0) (because the Patroller has to return to her starting point by the end of the period).
The independence number I is the cardinality of a maximal independent set.
Obviously I  J : Observe that both I and J depend on the parameters Q;T;m and on
the version of the game that is played, Go or Gp: For example, when T = 3 and m = 3; the node
subset f1; 3g of L3 is independent for the periodic game but not for the one-o¤ game.
For the Attacker, the independent strategy is to x an attack interval and then choose the
attack node equiprobably from some maximal independent set. For the Patroller, the covering
strategy is to choose equiprobably from a minimal set of covering patrols.
Note that for T = 2; patrols can be identied with edges of Q, so these denitions reduce to
the usual notion of an independent set not having adjacent nodes and a covering set consisting
of edges.
Lemma 12 1J  V  1I (with V = 1=I when I = J ).
Proof. The Attackers independent strategy gives the upper bound and the Patrollers covering
strategy gives the lower bound.
The cases where I = J deal with many patrolling games. For example, we can use this
technique to give another solution to the kite graph KT of Figure 2 for the periodic game with
T = m = 3: Here the nodes 2, 3, and 5 form an independent set (because 2d (i; i0) = 4  3 = T )
and intercepting patrols on the top left, top right and bottom edges (period 3 patrols of the
form (a; a; b; a; a; b : : : )) form a covering set. Thus Lemma 12 gives V = 1=I = 1=3; as we
demonstrated earlier by another method.
5 Patrolling on Special Classes of Graphs
We have no single form of analysis that is su¢ ciently robust to give the Value of an arbitrary
patrolling game; in general the Value would have to be obtained computationally. However for
certain classes of graphs we can determine either the Value in terms of the parameters m and n
(the number of nodes), or bounds on the Value: These classes are Hamiltonian graphs, bipartite
graphs and line graphs.
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5.1 Hamiltonian graphs
A Hamiltonian graph is a graph containing at least one cycle which visits each node exactly
once (i.e. a Hamiltonian cycle). A special case of the Hamiltonian graphs is the simple cycle
with n nodes Cn. (Another special case is the complete graph Kn:) The existence of a natural
cycle in the underlying graph is a common feature of the problem faced in application settings,
as often the area to be patrolled will be physically compact (consider, e.g. patrolling a campus).
Note that if m  n the Patroller can win by following the Hamiltonian cycle, so we assume that
m < n: We dene a random Hamiltonian patrol to be one which xes some Hamiltonian cycle,
starts at a random node i, and follows the cycle in a xed direction, repeating as required. Such
a patrol is always feasible in the one-o¤ game Go and is feasible in the periodic game Gp if T is
a multiple of n: Using this mixed strategy, the Patroller can get the best possible interception
probability V; namely the upper bound m=n of Proposition 2.
Theorem 13 If Q is Hamiltonian then
1. V o = mn ;
2. V p  mn with equality if T = kn; with k integer, and V p ! m=n as k !1 if T = kn+ 
with k integer and 0 <  < n integer:
Proof. First observe that in either case we have V  m=n by Lemma 2. In the one-o¤ game,
suppose the Patroller adopts a random Hamiltonian patrol. Then for any attack interval I;
w (I) is a random m-arc of the Hamiltonian cycle, and as such contains the attack node i with
probability m=n; as claimed. If T is a multiple of n; this strategy is also feasible in the periodic
game. To obtain the limiting result, note that if  = T modn 6= 0; the periodic Patroller
can modify the random Hamiltonian patrol by waiting at a random node during a random -
interval. This will not hurt her unless the attack interval I overlaps the waiting interval, which
has probability ( +m  1) =T; so

1   +m  1
T

m
n
 V p  V o = m
n
; and so V p ! m
n
: (2)
Since the above result applies to the cycle graph, we can use it to solve the game on some
graphs which can be obtained from the cycle graph by identication of nodes. We now solve the
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periodic Patrolling Game for the eight node graph shown below on the left of Figure 6 in the
case T = 10 and m = 4: First note that since the diameter is d = 5 we have from Lemma 9 that
the diametrical Attack strategy ensures that V  m=  2 d = 4=10: By viewing the graph as a
projection of C10 (with Value m=10 = 4=10 from Theorem 13) we conclude from Lemma 1 Part
4 that V  4=10; so V = 4=10:
Figure 6. A graph shown as projection of C10
For the cycle Cn where m = 2, and n is even, we can rene this result.
Proposition 14 For n even,
1. V p(Cn; T; 2) = 2n if T is even.
2. V p(Cn; T; 2) = 2T 1nT if T is odd.
Proof. For Part 1., the result follows from Lemma 12. For Part 2., Because Cn is bipartite,
Lemma 8 shows that it is bounded above by 2(T 1)+1nT =
2T 1
nT . To see that this is also a lower
bound, suppose the Patroller partitions the node set into n2 pairs of adjacent nodes, i.e. disjoint
edges. The Patroller then selects one of these edges (i0; i00) equiprobably and oscillates between
i0 and i00. Because T is odd and the game is periodic, conditional on her choice of (i0; i00), the
Patroller will have to repeat a node, i.e. w(t) = w(t+1) for some t, and she chooses both t and
the node (out of i0; i00) to repeat at random. Whichever node and time the Attacker chooses, he
will fail to be intercepted if he attacks at a node in N=i0; i00 or if he attacks the non-repeated
node at time t; otherwise he will be intercepted, and thus his probability of interception is
1    2n  n2   1+ 2n   12T  = 2T 1nT so this is a lower bound and thus we have a Value for the
game.
Because we have in Proposition 14 results which explicitly depend on T , we can use these to
illustrate in numerical terms an issue which we discussed in Section 2.2, namely what happens
to the value as the T goes to the limit. In particular, we see in Figure 7 the values for the game
on C4 with m = 2 as T goes to 1. Note that, as demonstrated analytically in Subsection 2.2,
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the gap between the one-o¤ and periodic games diminishes as the the value of the periodic game
ascends, but this convergence is not monotonic.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
T
V
one-off
periodic
Figure 7. The values of the one-o¤ and periodic games on C4 for m = 2 as T goes
to 1
5.2 Bipartite graphs
If Q is a bipartite graph (as dened earlier as having no odd cycles) we can partition its node
set into halfsets A = f1; : : : ; ag and B = f1; : : : ; bg ; with a  b; such that its only edges
are between nodes in A and nodes in B: If all such node pairs are edges then we say Q is the
complete bipartite graph Ka;b:
If m > 2b then the Patroller can win by using a patrol with period 2b which covers all the
nodes, that is, the covering number J is 1. So we assume m  2b:
Theorem 15 If Q is bipartite with halfsets of sizes a  b, then
1. V o  m= (2b) ; with equality if Q is complete bipartite (Ka;b);
2. V p  m= (2b) ; with equality if Q is complete bipartite (Ka;b) and T=2kb with k integer:
Further, if Q is complete bipartite (Ka;b); V p ! m= (2b) as k !1; if T = kn+  with k
integer and 0 <  < n integer.
Proof. We rst show that V o  m= (2b) ; which then gives the weaker inequality V p  m= (2b) :
Consider the Attacker mixed strategy of xing an attack interval I and picking the node i
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equiprobably among the b elements of B: For any patrol w; the probability that a random i in B
belongs to w (I) equals jw (I) \ Bj=b  (m=2) =b = m= (2b) : If m is odd, the Attacker strategy
must be modied to pick I and the shifted interval I + 1 equiprobably. In this case for any w
we have j (w (I) \B) j+ jw (I + 1) \ Bj  m and the probability that the attack is intercepted
by any w is given by
1
2
j (w (I)) j
b
+
1
2
j (w (I + 1) \B) j
b
 m
2b
:
The equality part follows for a = b from Theorem 13, as Kb;b is Hamiltonian. As in Theorem 13,
we have separate results for the one-o¤ and periodic cases, and specically we are only able to
show that our result applies for particular or limiting values of T in the periodic case. If a < b
then we can obtain Ka;b from Kb;b by identifying together a subset of b  a nodes of one of the
halfsets of Kb;b and then applying Lemma 1 (part 4) to assert that V o (Ka;b)  V o (Kb;b) = m=2b
in general and with a similar limiting result for the periodic case:
In all these cases, informally speaking, an optimal strategy for the Attacker is to x an attack
interval and choose the attack node equiprobably from the larger halfset; an optimal strategy for
the Patroller is to randomize over a collection of strategies which visit the larger half set every
second time period. In the case of m = 2, the Patroller chooses an edge joining the halfsets;
the Attackers and Patrollers strategies can be seen as a random choice from an independence
and covering set respectively; in this case the Theorem is closely related to Königs Theorem
(Harary, 1971, Theorem 10.2), since Königs Theorem states that the independence and covering
numbers of a bipartite graph are identical.
To illustrate the proof, consider the special case of the star graph Sn = K1;n 1 consisting of
a central node connected to n  1 extreme nodes. This models the situation where the Patroller
has responsibility for the safekeeping of a building which has multiple wings, accessible through
a common lobby area. We can view Sn as obtained from the even cycle graph C2(n 1) by
identifying (say) all even numbered nodes, as in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. S5 obtained from C8 by node identication.
This mode of reasoning leads us to discover additional equilibrium pairs for the Hamiltonian
case. Consider the cycle graph Cn for even n and T a multiple of n: We saw earlier that the
uniform strategy was optimal for the Attacker. But since Cn = Kn=2;n=2 is bipartite Theorem
15 now gives the additional optimal strategy of attacking equiprobably on the odd (or even)
nodes. In fact there is a further optimal Attacker strategy: since the diameter is d = n=2; the
diametrical strategy also gives m=
 
2 d

= m=n by Lemma 9.
5.3 Line graphs
Line graphs Ln seem to be particularly complex to analyze, but we give here some special cases
which illustrate the techniques we have developed earlier. We note that they are important in
the patrolling context for their relation to the problem of patrolling a border, for example in
order to prevent an agent from crossing a partially defended line between two regions. The
following case seems to be easy.
Theorem 16 If Q is a line and n  m+ 1, then
1. V o = m2(n 1) ;
2. V p  m2(n 1) with equality if T=2k(n   1) with k integer; V p ! m2(n 1) as k ! 1, if
T = kn+  with k integer and 0 <  < n integer:
Proof. Since d = n  1, it follows from Lemma 9 that V p  V o  m2(n 1) . That this bound is
tight follows from a use of Lemma 1 Part 4 and Theorem 13: we can arrive at Ln from C2(n 1)
through node identication in the manner of Figure 1. Thus, V (Ln)  V (C2(n 1)) = m2(n 1) .
In most of the examples in this paper the optimal strategies have been highly random, in
that the players used equiprobable mixtures of similar pure strategies. We did this mainly to
keep things simple, but the reader should not be misled into thinking this is always the case.
For example, consider the game Gp (L5; 4; 3). We claim that the value of this game is 37 .
Lemma 6 tells us that V p (L5; 4; 3)  11
V p(L2;4;3)
+ 1
V p(L3;4;3)
: Since V p (L2; 4; 3) = 1 and (from
Theorem 16) V p (L3; 4; 3) = 34 , we have that V
p (L5; 4; 3)  37 . Now consider the game from
the Attackers point of view. There are four possible attack intervals I, and ve possible attack
nodes i. Suppose the Attacker randomizes equiprobably over the intervals and over the nodes
with probabilities 37 each for nodes 1 and 5, and
1
7 for node 3. The Patroller could remain at
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node 1 or node 5 and intercept an attack with probability 37 or randomly move between either
1 and 3 or between 3 and 5. She then has a 34 chance of intercepting an attack which will take
place with probability 37 and a
3
4 chance of intercepting an attack with will take place with
probability 17 ; for an overall probability of interception of
3
4
 
3
7 +
1
7

= 37 . All other patrols yield
a lower expected payo¤ and so V p (L5; 4; 3)  37 .
Next consider Gp (L7; 5; 2) :We claim that the value of this game is 14 . We have I = 4 and so
from Lemma 12 we have V p  1=4: To ensure winning with this probability, the Patroller must
use "biased oscillations" on edges (i; i0) of the form (i; i; i0; i; i0), which we denote as i   i0, with
a random time rotation. Clearly i    i0 intercepts any attack on i and intercepts any attack
on i0 with probability 4=5 (that is unless the attack coincides with a repeated i): The optimal
probabilities of the biased oscillations on consecutive nodes are shown below.
1
4=16 2 1=16! 3 3=16 4 3=16! 5 1=16 6 4=16! 7
Attacks on any node are intercepted with probability at least 1=4; with equality except for
the central node 4 (which should never be attacked at equilibrium). For example an attack
on node 2 is intercepted with probability 4=5 if either 1    2 or 3    2 is adopted by the
Patroller, that is with probability (4=16 + 5=16) = 5=16: So it is intercepted with probability
(4=5) (5=16) = 1=4:
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have described a simple, intuitive game theoretic model which can serve as the
basis for obtaining optimal randomized patrols. Our results could be used by a scheduler of
patrols, to come up with a travel plan for a Patroller on a particular shift. Alternatively, the
analysis may also give insight into decisions at a more strategic level, when there is interest in
constructing or redesigning a facility which will have to be patrolled by a security force. For
example, topologies which have a Hamiltonian cycle are generally better (give higher interception
probability) than those which do not, which suggests that a good piece of advice might be to
include a Hamiltonian cycle. However, adding Hamiltonian cycles beyond the rst such cycle
does not, in our model, increase the interception probability further, suggesting that for a graph
which is already cyclic, constructing additional arcs might not yield a good return on investment.
The assumptions of the present paper can be relaxed to yield extended models. Some of
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these models may be similar in spirit to the model of the current paper but incorporate certain
real-world complexities which we have abstracted away. In this case some of the results of
this paper transfer smoothly over. For example, nodes may have di¤erent values in which
case Lemma 1 and Proposition 3) and some of the proof strategies (e.g. decomposition) can
be generalized in a straightforward way. Or to take another example, there may be multiple
patrollers in which case one can simply "multiply up" the numerator of Lemma 12.
On the other hand, there are some supercially similar games which may require quite
di¤erent formulations and proof strategies. For example:
 It may be natural to consider a continuous time formulation of this problem. An attack
takes place at any point of the network (not necessarily a node) on a continuous time
interval of xed length. The Patroller uses a unit speed path and wins if she is at the
attacked point at some time during the attack interval. This would model, for example,
the defense of a pipeline system, and would resemble to a greater extent the classical search
game problem.
 The Patroller may be alerted (perhaps noisily and with some error) to the presence of
an Attacker; and the Attacker may be alerted by a confederate who can identify when
a Patroller leaves a particular node (for example, if the Patroller is in a marked police
car). In this case new machinery would be required to capture the players evolving
knowledge state. Alternatively, it might be possible to formulate this problem so that the
considerable body of knowledge about di¤erential games could be applied.
 An absent-minded Patroller who randomizes anew at each time unit depending on her
location could be modelled through a Markov game. Such a game may have interesting
features: for example, a Patroller who can remember which direction she has come may
perform better on a cycle rather than a complete graph, as she is less likely to backtrack,
thus contradicting the "increasing in edges" property.
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